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Abstract 
This paper investigates how the institutional setting for protection of creditor rights affects 
bank lending and risk-taking.  An analytical model is specified to underpin banks‟ portfolio 
decisions, between loans and other earning assets such as government securities.  The model 
is augmented with various metrics, which proxy the institutional setting for creditor rights, 
and is estimated and tested on an unbalanced three-dimensional dataset of commercial banks 
in 20 African countries for 1995-2008.  It is found that three specific metrics induce banks to 
allocate a high proportion of their earning assets to loans: legal creditor rights; the efficient 
enforcement of creditor rights; and availability of information sharing mechanisms among 
banks.  However, the three metrics appear to work through different channels.  The 
enforceability of legal rights works not only through mitigating credit risks, but also through 
a composite effect of market competition and lower costs of information acquisition and 
contract enforcement.  The legal rights metric and information sharing metric exclusively rely 
on the composite effect. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been considerable interest in the role of non-market institutions in explaining 
economic growth (Henisz, 2000; Deaton, 2010). Research on institutional setting and 
economic growth generally concedes that the institutional framework (such as the protection 
of rights of parties involved in a contract, the quality of judicial enforcement and economic 
freedom) affects economic growth and crucially defines the incentives and constraints in a 
world characterized by imperfect information and incomplete contracts (Rodrik, 2000). It is 
argued that good quality non-market institutions reduce the cost, and increase the efficiency, 
of enforcement of contracts as well as improve the temperament and motivations of the 
participants involved (North, 1990). In addition, research on finance and development has 
accumulated robust evidence that a well-functioning banking system is strongly and causally 
associated with economic growth (DemirgucKunt and Levine, 2008). It is argued that banks 
exist because of incomplete and asymmetric information in financial markets (Neuberger, 
1997). Also, banks contribute to economic growth by easing the capital accumulation 
process, not only through intermediating savings into investment but also through mitigating 
information asymmetry and agency costs between lenders and borrowers. 
The important insights provided by the role of institutional setting in the literature on 
financial development and economic growth offer justification for the growing research on 
the association between the institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights 
(encompassing legal rights for creditors, the enforcement of legal rights and information 
sharing mechanism among creditors) and the development of the credit market. Although 
banks play the special role as financial intermediaries and information processors, their 
incentives, capacity and efficiency to carry out their function are subject to the rules that 
govern and shape the interactions among banks, borrowers and other players in the market 
place. Indeed, starting from the seminal paper of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Vishny 
(1998, henceforth LLSV), a series of research in the law and finance literature, based on 
country-level aggregate data, has established a general consensus that the quality of the legal 
protection, the enforceability of legal rights and the improvements in information sharing 
among creditors, are positively associated with the depth of financial system
1
 (LLSV, 1997, 
1998; Levine, 1998, 1999; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov et al., 2007). Also, strong 
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 In the cited papers, the common indicators used for financial depth are the ratio of private credit to gross 
domestic product and the degree to which the central bank versus commercial banks is allocating credit. 
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institutions for ensuring law and contract enforcement and for information sharing among 
banks appear to be necessary characteristics to reduce the fragility of the banking sector 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). 
Although existing theory offers testable propositions on the channels through which 
institutional settings for the protection of creditor rights get transmitted to the credit market, 
there is scant micro-analysis to identify and quantify the specific mechanisms (Haselmann, 
2010). Also, in contrast with the general agreement reached by the empirical research at the 
macro-level, the microeconomics evidence is controversial (Houston et al., 2010). Moreover, 
the literature tends to focus on the quantity of credit supplied by banks and banks‟ risk taking 
behaviour, and generally overlooks banks‟ operating costs associated with producing 
information and enforcing loan contracts and on the degree of competition in the credit 
market. Given the observation that the credit market is characterized not only by incomplete 
information but also by imperfect competition, it is plausible to argue that banks‟ portfolio 
decision making is a net reflection of credit risk, the cost of financial intermediation and the 
competitiveness condition in the market place (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
Hence, this paper seeks to identify and quantify specific mechanisms through which 
the institutional setting for protection of creditor rights impacts on bank lending and risk-
taking. An integrated analytical model is specified to show how banks‟ asset-allocation 
decisions, between loans and the competing stock of other earning assets, depend on: risk and 
return; bank-specific elasticity of supply; and operating costs. The model is augmented with 
metrics which proxy the institutional setting for protection of creditor rights, and is then 
estimated and tested on an unbalanced three-dimensional dataset of commercial banks in 20 
African countries for the period 1995-2008. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study presents the first integrated analysis of how 
the institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights affects the credit risks faced by 
banks, the degree of competition in the credit market, and banks‟ operating costs associated 
with acquisition of information and contract enforcement. It is expected that the evidence 
generated by the study will not only yield valuable insights into the inconsistency between 
macro and micro literature but it will also offer important implications for the formulation of 
policy initiatives to achieve an efficient credit market.  
The empirical application of our analytical approach to banking in Africa is timely. In 
many African countries, banks are predominant in the financial system and bank loans are the 
primary external financing source for firms (Kirkpatrick, et al., 2008). Moreover, since the 
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1980s, most African countries have initiated various financial reforms aimed at promoting 
efficient credit markets. However, the reforms have failed to deliver increased financial 
intermediation (Kasekende, et al., 2009). While there are sizable differences between 
different countries within the region, financial sectors in Africa are among the shallowest in 
the world (McDonald and Schumacher, 2007). Credit to the private sector provided by the 
banking sector as a percentage of GDP has been declining over years. Curiously, this 
outcome cannot be attributed to the shortage of bank liquidity; many African banking 
systems are fairly liquid by international standards. It is rather a result of banks‟ preference 
for allocating the financial resources they have mobilized to other earning assets, particularly 
safer government securities, over private credit (Allen et al., 2010). Among several reasons 
that have been identified to explain the dysfunctionality in financial intermediation, the 
important factors include high risks and costs of financial intermediation, induced by the 
absence of strong institutional infrastructure (Honohan and Beck, 2007)
2
. There is a general 
consensus that bank regulatory reforms cannot be viewed in isolation from policies and 
regulations by national institutions. Given ongoing efforts to correct the weaknesses and 
provide an enabling institutional environment for African banking, and the high hopes which 
policy makers place in those efforts, there is a need for empirical analysis of institutional 
settings which influence banks‟ provision of loans. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the detailed 
structure of the general model of portfolio selection which specifically allows for risk and 
imperfect competition as well as cost of financial intermediation. Section 3 reviews the 
various channels proposed by the literature to capture the effects of creditor rights, the 
enforcement of legal rights and information sharing on credit market performance. Section 4 
describes our empirical design, measurement of variables and data. The estimation and 
testing results are discussed in Chapter 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. A model of banks’ portfolio allocation 
Our analytical framework for a bank‟s portfolio allocation, between private credit (loans) and 
other earning assets, is based on profit maximization as the objective function. The model is 
closely related to Klein (1970), Klein (1971) and Hannan (1991).  Rather than providing a 
comprehensive theory of the banking firm, the model is used to underpin how banks‟ 
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Honohan and Beck (2007, p.16) identify the key factors, namely, “... rationalization and clarification of laws, 
streamlining of court procedures, establishment of credit registries, and training of financial professionals.” 
4 
 
portfolio allocation behaviour is influenced by differences across competing types of earning 
assets, in terms of risk and return characteristics, the elasticity of supply, and the marginal 
operating cost, among other considerations. 
We assume bank i has two primary sources of loanable funds, one is equity (Ei) 
invested in the bank and the other is deposits (Di) mobilized by the bank. The bank allocates 
aggregate loanable funds between a single aggregate loan (Li) and a single aggregate 
competing stock of other earning assets, i.e. government securities (Si). Therefore, the bank‟s 
balance sheet identity is iiii EDSL  , and 1 0 ,/  iiii LE  , which indicates the 
level of capitalization of the bank. 
We assume the credit market structure is oligopolistic, where bank i operates among 
other N-1 banks, given price of deposits and non-interest operating cost.  
The bank faces a downward sloping demand curve. The contract rate of interest is 
)( i
i
L Lr . The revenue associated with the provision of loans is iiL
i LLr )(  when all the loans 
are repaid.  In the event of default, when the loss is larger than zero, the expected revenue 
associated with loans is ii
i
Li LLru )( , where u is  a product of the probability of recovery given 
default and the probability that the loan will default. Because 1u , 1-u  therefore stands for 
the virtual default risk faced by the bank. The term u is exogenously given for the bank‟s 
decision at time t.  
Following stylized models of the banking firm, we assume government securities are 
free of default risk and are in perfect elastic supply to the bank (i.e. a perfectly competitive 
market since each individual bank is one of an infinite number of other operators in the 
market). Thus, the revenue associated with holding government securities by bank i is i
t
s Sr , 
where sr is the interest rate on government securities. Since in addition to an administrative 
cost incurred on government securities, loans have an additional operating cost of dealing 
with asymmetric information and enforcing repayment in the case of default, marginal 
variable operating cost of loans is expected to be larger than that of government securities. 
The expected profit of bank i at time t can be written as
3
: 
fiiiiiciiiDisii
i
Li
e
i CDSLCrLDrSrLLru  ),,(***)(                (1) 
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 The flat risk premium per unit of deposits is easily accommodated into the interest rate of deposits.  
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Where  ),,( iiii DSLC indicates the overall operating cost of the bank (i.e. non-interest 
operating cost), which is a function of the quantity of loans, the quantity of government 
securities and the quantity of deposits; LC
'  and sC
' are marginal variable operating cost of 
loans and government securities; Dr  is the interest rate of deposits; cr is the interest rate on 
financial capital
4
; and fiC = fixed costs.  
The bank chooses the quantity of loans and government securities in order to 
maximize the expected profit expressed in Equation (1), subject to its balance sheet 
constraint.  The first-order conditions for the bank‟s expected profit maximization yields the 
following equations, where  is the Lagrangean multiplier: 
0)1(* )(
' 


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e
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S
          (3) 
Manipulating equation (2), we obtain
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Where 
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r
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e
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

 is the demand elasticity for loans of bank i, as an indicator of the bank‟s 
market power. From (4) and (3), we obtain: 
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In Equation (5), the left hand side is the marginal return on government securities, 
while the right hand side is the expected marginal return on loans (adjusted for the 
capitalization of the bank). Let LX  be the proportion of total loanable funds allocated by the 
bank to loans, and SX  is the proportion of total loanable funds allocated by the bank to 
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 In Dermine (1986), it was explained as a proxy for the opportunity cost of equity capital. 
5
 As noted by Klein (1970, p.492), “what is particularly interesting about this framework is that it allows 
explicitly for difference in loan demand confronting banks and for differences in the elasticity of demand for 
bank loans”. The framework is not constructed as a loan supply curve; rather, it is a reduced form equation 
relating the equilibrium loan/total earning asset ratio to variables which are exogeneous to the bank.  
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government securities, and 1 SL XX . Thus, LX  is chosen by the bank at the point at 
which the expected marginal return on loans is equal to the marginal return on government 
securities.  
Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
scsiSiiSiLii
L
i
L rrrCCCu
e
r  )}(){()
1
1{ )(
'
)(
'
)(
'       (6) 
Figure 1: Equilibrium for loans  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 decomposes the determinants of the equilibrium level of the quantity of loans 
for the bank implied in Equation (6).  Line 1 ( dL ) indicates the downward demand curve 
faced by bank i. Line 2 ( LMR ) is the marginal revenue of loans. The difference between line 
1 and line 2, or the quantity of loans in equilibrium, is attributable to the presence of market 
power. The larger degree of market power (i.e. a lower degree of competition in the market 
place) is associated with a larger difference in the quantity of loans, ceteris paribus. Line 3 
(E( LMR )) is the expected marginal revenue of loans. As indicated above, the presence of the 
loss upon default is the reason for the divergence between line 2 and line 3. The larger the 
risks upon default, the larger the decrease in the quantity of loans, ceteris paribus. The further 
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left-hand shift from line 3 to line 4 is due to additional marginal operating cost of loans 
associated with asymmetric information, relative to government securities. The larger 
difference is related to a larger decrease in the equilibrium level of the quantity of loans, 
ceteris paribus. 
The effect of an increase in bank capitalization depends on the sign of ( ssc rCr 
' ). 
In the case where 0)( '  ssc rCr , the increase in capitalization induces a decrease in the 
quantity of loans, corresponding to a shift from line 4 to line 5. The assumption that the 
government securities market is perfectively competitive implies that ssD rCr 
' , i.e. 
marginal cost of government securities equals the interest rate on the securities. Hence, the 
sign of ( )' ssc rCr  is determined by whether equity capital is more expensive than 
deposits
6
. A negative relationship between capitalization and the quantity of loans suggests 
that higher capital costs induce a reduction in bank loans. The decrease in risk-free rate of 
interest rs would result in the increase in the difference between rL – rs, thereby inducing an 
increase in the quantity of loans
7
, and vice versa. Overall, the proportion of total loanable 
funds allocated by the bank to loans (XL) is given by (7), with the theoretical predicted effect 
of each determinant. 
XL = f(rL – rs, competition, loss on default, MC of IP, capitalization)   (7) 
 (+) (+)  (-)  (-)  (?) 
Where MC of IP is the marginal cost of information acquisition. 
3. Institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights 
Our central argument is that the institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights 
(specifically, legal rights for creditors, the efficient enforcement of the legal rights, and 
availability of information sharing mechanisms among banks) influences the degree of 
competition in the credit market, the default risk banks take, and the operating cost paid by 
banks to acquire and process information.  In turn, these considerations affect banks‟ 
portfolio allocation in terms of the proportion of total loanable funds allocated to loans rather 
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 The theoretical literature assumes that equity capital is more expensive than deposits; the assumption is 
justified by adverse selection and moral hazard considerations (Thakor, 1996). 
7
 Since in reality a change in the risk-free rate of interest will raise interest rates generally, the bank‟s asset 
allocation will depend on the relative rate of interest.  
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than government securities. We review the theoretical ideas and empirical findings that 
underpin our argument. 
3.1 Theory 
Two competing views, identified by Djankov et al. (2007), which explain the quantity of 
private credit supplied by banks are the information theory of credit and the power theory of 
credit.  The two theories focus on different stages of the loans contract and suggest that the 
bank‟s willingness to grant credit depends on: perception of the likelihood of the borrower‟s 
repayment; the possibility of recovery in the case of default; and the costs of screening, 
monitoring and enforcing loan contracts. 
The information theory of credit underpins the importance of a bank‟s knowledge 
about the ability and willingness of the borrower to honour the loan contract.  The 
asymmetric information between borrowers and banks gives incentives for less-informed 
banks to acquire information; the more a bank invests in information acquisition, the more 
accurate is its prediction of the probability of repayment by the borrower and the better the 
quality of its lending (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2004). However, 
the increase in the intensity of information acquisition may result in higher operating costs for 
the bank. The presence of informational sharing institutions among banks about the 
characteristics of their borrowers, either via private credit bureaus or public credit registries, 
may enhance the bank‟s lending through reducing the cost of information acquisition. The 
exchange of information may not only enable the bank to distinguish between a good 
applicant and a bad one, but also it may incentivise the borrower to exert more effort to 
honour their debt obligation (Brown et al., 2009). 
Hence, availability of informational sharing among banks helps reduce operating 
costs, including the cost of screening potential borrowers ex ante and that of monitoring 
existing loans contract. The quality of lending is enhanced by the mitigation of adverse 
selection ex ante for loan contracts and mitigation of moral hazard during loan contracts. 
While the information theory of credit mainly focuses on the role of institutional 
setting for a cost-effective prevention of default, the power theory of credit is based on the 
transfer of control rights upon default. Stronger legal rights give the bank more power to 
force repayment by seizing collateral, or even by taking control of the borrower‟s ex post 
contract, during default. This leads to a higher recovery rate in the event of default and a 
decrease of the default risk banks eventually bear. In addition, efficient judicial enforcement 
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of legal rights reduces the uncertainty and cost faced by the bank in pursuing repayment. 
Hence, banks which operate in an institutional environment characterised by higher legal 
creditor rights and more efficient enforcement of these rights show more willingness to 
provide credit, even with limited information about the borrower. Although the power theory 
of credit mainly emphasizes the recovery of bad loans, it has implications for the prevention 
of bad loans. Arguably, the power of creditors endowed by better institutional protection 
creates a more credible threat to borrowers to perform in line with the bank‟s interest, which 
attenuates the credit risk associated with moral hazard on part of borrowers and the bank‟s 
cost of dealing with moral hazard and adverse selection. 
However, the argument that stronger creditor rights and information sharing lead to a 
lower default rate is only valid with respect to an individual borrower and if the bank does 
not change its incentives to acquire information about the borrower (Jappelli and Pagano, 
2002; Brown et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2010). In the case where the informational 
opaqueness of an individual borrower and the losses of the bank decrease when a given 
borrower defaults, the marginal benefit of banks‟ information production also decreases, so 
does banks‟ effort to gather and process extra information about the borrower. Banks may be 
inclined to reduce the number of covenants in the financial contract (Houston et al., 2010). As 
a result, the probability of default of a given borrower may increase. Also, even if stronger 
creditor rights and information sharing really lead to a lower default rate of an individual 
borrower, such effect may not necessarily translate into a decrease in the average default rate 
of the loan portfolio if there is concomitant change in the bank‟s willingness to grant credit to 
riskier and previously rationed borrowers (Brown et al., 2009; Laven and Majnoni, 2005). If 
the relative weight of lower-grade borrowers increases in the loan portfolio, the average 
default rate of the loan portfolio would increase although the probability of default rate of 
each borrower decreases. Similar to the case of a given borrower, whether the actual average 
losses of the loan portfolio increase or not depends on the extent to which a higher recovery 
rate compensates for a higher default rate (Houaton et al., 2010). 
Also important is the influence of the institutional setting for the protection of creditor 
rights on the degree of competition in the credit market, which in turn leads to the change in 
the quantity of credit supplied by banks. As opposed to other markets, an idiosyncratic barrier 
that undermines the contestability in the credit market is the information advantage of the 
inside bank compared to outside banks (Boot, 2000; Sengupa, 2007). The repeated interaction 
with the same customer over time or across products entails a lower information asymmetry 
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between the inside bank and its borrowers. In recognition of the information advantages of 
the inside bank, outside banks are cautious to distinguish between the “lemons” rejected by 
the inside bank and creditworthy borrowers seeking to mitigate the “hold up” problem of 
their existing banking relationship. Such a “winner‟s curse” problem deters other incumbent 
banks to compete with the inside bank for borrowers and hinders potential entrants to 
materialize their entry intention. Informational sharing among banks reduces the 
informational disadvantage of the outside banks in ex ante loan contracts. Strong legal 
protection ex post strengthens the efficacy of collateral used by outside banks to bridge the 
information gap ex ante and to seize collateral as a defensive line in the event of default. This 
allows outside banks to bid more aggressively with the inside bank. In this way, stronger 
creditor rights and information sharing contribute positively to the enhancement of 
competition in the lending market and lead to greater credit supply (Barth et al., 2009). 
3.2 Empirical literature 
The existing empirical literature suggests that the quality of the legal framework for the 
protection of creditor rights is important in influencing the quantity of credit supply. The 
evidence also indicates that the legal enforceability of financial contracts is more important 
than the legal codes in stimulating a larger volume of credit. Using bank-level data in both 
developing and developed countries over the period 2000-2006, Cole and Turk-Ariss (2010) 
find that banks allocate a smaller portion of their assets to loans when creditor rights are 
stronger, while the opposite is true when the legal enforcement of creditor rights is more 
efficient. The findings appear to be consistent with those obtained by Bae and Goyal (2009), 
who show that the enforcement of contracts, rather than the legal right of creditors, generates 
a significant impact on increasing loan quantities. Furthermore, Safavian and Sharma (2007) 
analyse firm-level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 2005, and find that the positive 
impact of legal rights on firms‟ access to bank credit decreases with the decrease in the 
efficiency of courts. Therefore, poor enforceability of creditor rights diminishes the positive 
impact of legal rights on the quantity of credit supply. The results obtained by Safavian and 
Sharma (2007) are consistent with the argument put by Berkowitz, et al. (2003) and Pistor, et 
al. (2000), that the effectiveness of the law is more important than the written law in 
promoting financial development for transition and developing countries. Given the fact that 
law is a transplanted institution for most of those countries, the readiness and the competence 
of the recipient country are crucial for the legal system to work. Regarding the implications 
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of information sharing for banks‟ credit supply, Love and Mylenko (2003) use cross-section 
firm-level data and find that private informational sharing facility are associated with lower 
financial constraints perceived by firms. Similarly, Brown et al. (2009) find that information 
sharing is associated with improved credit availability in a cross-section of firms in transition 
economies.  Further, it is shown that banks are motivated by informational sharing 
opportunities to provide loans to riskier and previously rationed borrowers; in fact, the 
positive association between information sharing and credit availability is found to be 
stronger for small and young firms (Love and Mylenko, 2003; Brown et al., 2009).  In 
contrast, Bennardo et al., (2009) indicates that the improvement of bank‟s knowledge that 
borrowers have multiple lending relationships as a result of information sharing among banks 
induces the bank to ration credit, for fear of increased default probability of a given borrower 
due to the large total exposure of the borrower. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies that use bank-level data to 
investigate the link between the legal framework for the protection of credit rights and banks‟ 
risk-taking behaviour. Godlewski (2006) analyses 297 default banks for the period 1990 - 
2002 in 34 emerging market economies and finds that banks‟ risk taking behaviour is 
negatively affected by quality of the rule of law and bank‟s default probability is positively 
related to the excess risks taken by banks.  In contrast, Houston et al. (2010) find that stronger 
creditor rights tend to promote greater risk taking of banks and increase the likelihood of 
financial crisis in a large cross-country study during 2000-2007. On the other hand, the 
empirical evidence derived from firm-level data is controversial. John et al. (2008) find that 
increase protection on investors leads to higher firm-level riskiness. However, Acharya et al., 
(2009) suggest that stronger credit rights encourage management of firms to reduce corporate 
risk-taking through diversifying mergers and adopting appropriate operating policy. 
The existing empirical evidence appears to confirm the positive impact of information 
sharing among lenders on the probability of default of individual borrowers. Kalberg and 
Udell (2003) document that availability of trade credit history reports, compared to financial 
statements alone, improves default predictions. Also, Brown and Zehnder (2007)‟s 
experimental study suggests that the presence of information sharing increases an individual 
borrower‟s repayment rate in the case where the mobility of borrowers across banks is high. 
However, Houston et al. (2010) find that greater information sharing leads to decreased bank 
risk, and reduced likelihood of a financial crisis. From a different perspective, Barth et al, 
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(2009) find that information sharing reduces lending corruption, and helps enhance the 
positive effect of competition on curtailing lending corruption. 
Despite the plethora of research on the quality of institutions and competition in the 
economy (Acemoglu, et al., 2001), there is sparse empirical research on the impact of the 
legal framework for the protection of credit rights and information sharing on the cost of 
financial intermediation and the degree of competition in the lending market. Three 
exceptions, closely related to this research, are Claessens and Laeven (2004), Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al., (2004), and Laeven and Majnoni (2005).  Claessens and Laeven (2004) measure the 
degree of competition at the industry-level, by estimating the extent to which changes in 
input prices are reflected in revenues earned by specific banks in 50 countries' banking 
systems.  It is found that the quality of protection of property right, a broad measure of the 
quality of legal framework, does not exercise an independent effect on competition. 
However, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) measure the quality of institutions by national 
indicators of economic freedom, or property rights protection, and find that a better quality of 
institutional indicator is associated with lower net interest margins and overhead expenditures 
cross-bank. The findings suggest that the overall institutional environment is more conducive 
to private sector competition, by reducing market power, and the cost of financial 
intermediation. Laeven and Majnoni (2005) also find that the improvements in the quality of 
legal framework lower the country-level interest rate spread. 
4. Empirical design, variables and data 
4.1 Empirical specification 
The analytical framework of a bank‟s portfolio allocation between loans and government 
securities, in Section 2, suggests that the proportion of total earning assets allocated by bank i 
to loans at time t is a function of the difference between the interest rate on loans and that on 
government securities (MAR), the degree of competition in the lending market (COM), the 
default risk facing banks involved in credit supply (RISK), the marginal information 
production cost of loans (COST), and the capitalization level of the bank (CAR).  Hence, we 
specify the following model: 
(?)       (-)       (-)       )(         )(               
CAR)  COST,  RISK,  COM,   MAR,(fX L


       (8) 
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On the basis of the theoretical and empirical literature, reviewed in Section 3, it is 
plausible to hypothesize that legal rights for creditors (LEG), the enforceability of legal rights 
(ENFOR) and information sharing mechanisms among creditors (SHAR), influence the 
degree of competition in the lending market (COM), the default risk taken by banks (RISK) 
and the operating cost paid by the bank to acquire and process information (COST), and a 
vector of typical factors (W). Thus, we have: 
(11)                                                                                 )W  SHAR,ENFOR, f(LEG,COST
(10)                                                                                 )W  SHAR,ENFOR, (LEG, fRISK
(9)                                                                                 )W  SHAR,ENFOR, LEG,(fCOM
costt
riskt
comt



 
Where, Wcom, Wrisk and Wcost are the vectors of stylized determinants for: the degree of 
competition in the credit market; the default risk taken by banks; and operating costs for 
acquiring and processing information, respectively.  
Our objective is to examine the impact of legal rights for creditors, the enforcement of 
contracts and information sharing mechanisms among banks on the degree of competition in 
the lending market, the default risk banks are taking and the operating cost of banks to 
produce information, and through those channels to influence the credit supply of banks.  
Hence, we adopt a two-stage analysis.  In the first stage, in equation (12), we examine 
the influence of legal rights for creditors, the enforcement of contracts and information 
sharing mechanisms among creditors on the risk-taking behaviour by banks, controlling for 
other industry-wide and bank-specific variables. In the second stage, in equation (13), the 
credit risk predicted by the first equation is lagged one period and incorporated into a second 
regression equation to explain the proportion of total loanable funds allocated by the bank to 
loans, along with legal rights for creditors, the enforcement of contracts, information sharing 
mechanism among creditors and other industry-wide and bank-specific variables. By doing 
so, we essentially single out the influence of the institutional setting indicators on default risk, 
while combine other two channels into a composite effect. Notably, such procedure implicitly 
assumes the bank‟s decision making into a two-step process, i.e. the bank forms its 
perception (expectation) of default risk in the supply of credit at time t according to 
predetermined variables at the time t-1, and then decides how to allocate its assets between 
loans and government securities. Thus, the perception of default risk, which is determined 
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jointly by various incentives internal to the bank and certain institutional environment which 
truly is exogenous to the bank at time t-1
8
, is exogenous to the bank‟s asset allocation 
decisions at time t. In detail, the estimating equations are: 
 
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Where, RISKjit, the dependent variable of Equation (12), is the default risk of bank i in 
country j at time t, measured as the ratio of loan loss provision over total loans; the rest of the 
variables are defined and discussed below. 
4.2 National institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights 
Our main explanatory variables are national institutional setting for the protection of creditor 
rights; it includes the measures of legal right of creditors (LEG), the enforceability of legal 
rights (ENFOR) and information sharing among banks (SHAR). 
To measure the strength of legal right of creditors, we create a rank order index based 
on the Creditor Right Index developed by Djankov et al. (2007) and the enhanced version of 
this index provided by the World Bank‟s Doing Business Index. Djankov et al. (2007) 
constructed the Creditor Right Index to measure the legal right of secured creditor in 
bankruptcy against defaulting borrowers for a sample of 129 countries over 1978-2003. It 
consists of four components: (i) whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral 
once a reorganization petition is approved (no “automatic stay” on assets); (ii) whether a 
borrower filing for reorganization is subjected to creditor consent or minimum dividend; (iii) 
whether secured creditors are ranked the first in the distribution of proceeds of liquidating a 
bankrupt firm among other creditors (secured credit paid first); (iv) whether creditors or an 
administrator is responsible for running the business during reorganization, rather than having 
the debtor continue to run the business (no management stay). A value of one is given to each 
component, and the aggregated legal right index ranges from zero (poor creditor rights) to 
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 This kind of treatment can be recognized as the unobserved variable model used by Zellner (1970) and 
Goldberger (1972). In our context, the perception of virtual default risk of the bank is unobservable, but it is 
related to observed predetermined variables.  
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four (strong creditor rights). The index was further refined by the World Bank‟s Doing 
Business Report to include: (v) whether general rather than specific description of assets is 
permitted in collateral agreements; (vi) whether general rather than specific description of 
debt is permitted in collateral agreements; (vii) whether any legal or natural person may grant 
or take security; (viii) whether a unified registry including charges over movable property 
operates; (ix) whether parties may agree on enforcement procedures by contract; and (x) 
whether creditors may both seize and sell collateral out of court. Again, a score of 1 is 
assigned for each component. The inclusion of those six features of the law makes the index 
range 0 - 10, with higher scores indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better 
designed to expand access to credit. The new index was updated annually by the World 
Bank‟s Doing Business Report 2004 onwards. To handle the incompatibility of the index 
before and after 2003, induced by the different composition of Djankov et al., (2007)‟s index 
and that of the World Bank‟s Doing Business Report index, we follow Berger et al. (2005) 
and rank the index of each sample country for each year in ascending order and then convert 
to a uniform scale over [0, 1] using the formula (order − 1)/(n − 1), where order is the place 
in ascending order of the country in each year and n is the number of sample countries in that 
year
9
. The country with the highest index has the best rank of 1, and the country with the 
lowest index has the worst rank of 0. Thus, a country‟s rank in a year is the proportion of 
sample countries in that year with lower index, so a country with an index higher than 70% of 
other countries in that year has a rank that year of 0.70. The basic principal of the index is 
that higher values of the rank index indicate stronger creditor rights, for the country. 
To measure the effectiveness of law enforcement (ENFOR), we use the “Rule of 
Law” index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). The variable reflects the perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in, and abide by the rules of, society and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. A higher index implies better enforcement. Moreover, since 
the indicator is constructed through reasonably comparable methodologies from one year to 
the next, it can be used to make comparisons of countries over time, and also can be used to 
compare different countries‟ scores in the same year (Kaufmann et al., 2009). The annual 
indicator is available for 212 countries in 1996, 1998 and during 2000-2008, while our 
sample period is 1995 - 2008. To make as much time variation in the indicator as possible, 
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 The correlation of our legal right index and Djankov et al.(2007)‟s index is 0.9755 (significant at 1%). 
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we use the value in 1996 to proxy for 995 value, the arithmetic average of 1996 and 1998 to 
construct the indicator in 1997, and that of 1998 and 2000 to construct the indicator in 1999. 
To capture information sharing among banks, we define a dummy variable (SHAR) 
with a value of 1 from the year when either a public registry
10
 or a private bureau
11
 starts to 
operate in a country and onwards, and 0 prior to it. The information about the timing when 
the information sharing mechanisms started to operate is collected from Djankov et al., 
(2007) and the World Bank‟s Doing Business Report. 
4.3 Regulatory variables 
We include proxies for regulations and supervision ( jtZ ) in order to control for industry-wide 
institutional setting for bank risk taking. Specifically, we consider the stringency of 
regulatory capital requirements (CAPRQ), the power granted to authorities to intervene in 
bank management (OFFPR), private monitoring (PRI), regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities (FREE) and the existence of deposit insurance scheme (INSUR). 
The main database for CAPRQ, OFFPR, and PRI consists of three surveys by the 
World Bank in 2000, 2003 and 2008
12
. We use the value in 2000 for the period 1995-2000, 
the value in 2003 for 2001-2003 and the value in 2008 for 2004-2008. CAPRQ accounts for 
the regulation regarding the source of funds that can be counted as regulatory capital, whether 
the sources have to be verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities and whether risk 
elements and value losses are considered while calculating the regulatory capital. OFFPR 
relates to supervisory power in terms of prompt corrective action, declaring insolvency, and 
restructuring. For both CAPR and OFFPR, a higher value indicates stronger official 
regulation. Despite the expectation that higher capital stringency and stronger official power 
would prevent banks from excessive risk-taking behaviour, some theoretical contributions 
and empirical evidence seem to suggest otherwise. Using a mean-variance framework, Koehn 
and Santomero (1980) indicate that if capital is relatively expensive, the increase in the 
                                                          
10
 A public registry is a database owned by a public authority, say the central bank, which collects information 
on credit worthiness of borrowers and makes it available to financial institutions (Djankov et al., 2007). 
11
 A private bureau is a private firm that maintains a database on credit worthiness of borrowers, which 
facilitates the exchange of information among banks and other financial institutions (Djankov et al., 2007). 
12
We construct the index for the three regulatory variables by designing 1/0 score for each question, following 
Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Pasiouras (2007), among others. An alternative approach is to use principal 
components analysis (PCA), as in Beck et al. (2006). Barth et al. (2004) use both approaches and note that the 
drawback of using the index is that it assigns equal weight to each of the questions, while the disadvantage of 
the PCA is that it is less obvious how a change in the response to a question modifies the index. While they only 
report the results from the latter approach, Barth et al. (2004) mention that “we have confirmed all this paper‟s 
conclusions using both methods” (p. 218). 
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stringency of capital requirement diminishes the bank‟s expected returns. The attempt of 
banks to restore the expected return would induce them to restructure investment towards the 
ones with higher risk and higher return. In the cases when the increase in the bank‟s risk 
overweighs the increase in capital, a higher default probability appears. In addition, if the 
purpose of the imposition of higher capital requirements is to enhance the ability of banks to 
internalize their risk taking, the requirements are likely to be companied by the increase in 
bank risk-taking (Altunbus et al., 2007). In addition, stronger power in supervising and 
regulating banks may imply a higher level of supervisory forbearance in case of imprudent 
behaviour by banks; thereby giving regulatory authorities greater leeway to abuse their power 
for private gain (Barth et al., 2003; Beck et al., 2006). 
Our index of private monitoring (PRI) refers to the degree to which bank supervision 
forces banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector. Arguably, private 
monitoring exerts more effective governance compared to the official supervisory power 
because it is less likely to be captured by politicians and banks. Therefore, empowering 
private market discipline would be helpful in mitigating banks‟ excessive risk taking (Hay 
and Shleifer, 1998; Barth et al., 2004). However, as warned by Crockett (2002, p.979), for 
private market discipline to be fully effective in ensuring financial stability, four prerequisites 
have to be met. First, market participants need to have sufficient information to reach 
informed judgements. Second, they need to have the ability to process it correctly. Third, they 
need to have the right incentives. Finally, they need to have the right mechanisms to exercise 
discipline. Moreover, the lack of an efficient functioning legal system would seriously 
compromise the operation of private market discipline. Consistent with this argument, Beck 
et al., (2006) find that supervisory practices, which force information disclosure by banks, 
work best to promote integrity in lending in countries that adhere to the rule of law.  
With respect to the proxy for the restrictions on bank activities, we follow Gonzalea 
(2005) and use the Financial Freedom Index (FREE) published annually for each country by 
Heritage Foundation
13
 since 1995. The Index reflects a country‟s financial climate: it 
measures the extent of government regulation of financial services; the extent of state 
intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of opening and operating 
financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals); and government 
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 Gonzalea (2005) calculate the correlation between the Heritage Financial Freedom Index (HFFI) and the 
summary index of the level of regulatory restrictions on banks to engage in three non-traditional activities 
(SECURITIES, INSURANCE, and REAL ESTATE) and to own and control non-financial firms 
(BANKOWN). It is found that the HFFI captures freedom for banks to engage in the three activities. 
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influence on the allocation of credit. The overall score is scaled 0 – 100, with higher values 
indicating lower degrees of restriction. In theory, the increase in financial freedom has 
opposite implications for the risks banks are taking. It allows banks to take on risky business, 
which may erode the safety and soundness of banks‟ balance sheet. However, financial 
freedom offers banks opportunities to utilize economies of scope and scale, and to explore 
new profit generation and risk diversification. Further, it increases the operational autonomy 
and accountability of banks and incentivises banks to invest in information collection during 
the course of credit supply and to exercise creditors‟ right to recover bad debt. Overall, 
therefore, increased financial freedom may reduce the risks taken by banks. Indeed, a 
negative relation between regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the stability of the 
banking system is found by Barth et al. (2006) and Gonzalez (2005).  Also, Pasiouras et al. 
(2006) find that lower restrictions on bank activities result in higher credit ratings of banks. 
Finally, we define a dummy variable (INSUR) for the presence of explicit deposit 
insurance to control for its influence on risk taking incentives.  It has been long suggested 
that deposit insurance may intensify the moral hazard problem of banks since depositors are 
less likely to enforce market discipline on banks (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Gonzalez, 
2005). Based on information from Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2005) and the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers, the dummy variable takes a value of one from the year when 
the explicit deposit insurance was put into effect, and zero prior to it.  
4.4 Macroeconomomic indicators 
To take into account the macro-economic variables ( jtM ) that may have influence on risks 
banks are taking, we use the inflation rate (INFLA) and the natural logarithm of GDP 
(constant 2000 US dollar) (LNGDP) for each country over 1996-2008, collected from the 
African Development Indicators. Higher inflation distorts decision-making, exacerbates 
information asymmetry and introduces price volatility; hence, we predict a positive 
relationship between inflation and bank risk taking.  LNGDP serves as a proxy for a country‟s 
economic development, and is expected to be negatively related to bank risk.  
4.5  Bank-specific variables 
To allow for the bank-specific characteristics ( jitB ) that might explain cross-bank differences 
in default risks, we include the return on total assets (ROA), measured by the ratio of pre-
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taxation profit over total assets, to capture the impact of franchise value on bank-risk taking. 
As argued by Gonzalez (2005), more profitable banks would more likely institute 
conservative investment policy since they face higher opportunity cost of going bankruptcy. 
To capture the impact of scale diversification, we include MARSHAR, which is measured by 
the stock of loans of bank i as percentage of the sum of the stock of all the sample banks 
belonging to the same country as bank i. We further include a measurement of scope 
diversification (SP), namely the Herfindahl index of income concentration, i.e. 


2
1
2
i
iSSP , 
and 


2
1
/
i
iii yyS , 1y  refers to interest-income and 2y  refers to non-interest income. SP=1 
means that the bank is totally specialized, and SP=0.5 means that the bank produces totally 
diversified income (i.e. interest income and non-interest income have the equal share in total 
income). A smaller value indicated a better diversified income structure. Finally, to capture 
cross-bank differences in the quality of risk management skill, we include SKILL, which is 
computed by non- interest overhead costs divided by the total earning assets of the bank. A 
higher value indicates a lower management skill.  
In the second stage of the analysis, Equation (13) incorporates one-time period lag of 
the predicted value of default risk of banks (

 )1(tjiRISK ) with our key variables of national 
institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights (i.e. LEG, ENFOR, and SHAR) with 
other control variables. The dependent variable is the proportion of total earning assets 
allocated by the bank i to loans at time t(CREDITRATIO), measured by the ratio of total loans 
to the sum of total loans and government securities. While we control for the same set of 
macroeconomomic indicators (i.e. jtM ) in equation (13), the regulatory variables ( jtR ) and 
bank-specific variables ( jitBANK ) that are included in Equation (13) are slightly different 
from that in Equation (12). Such change is mainly due to the change in our selection 
criterion: we now attempt to control for the potential explanatory influences on the cross-
bank differences in the proportion of total earning assets allocated to loans, which is not 
transmitted through their impacts on default risk of banks. Specifically, the regulatory 
variables included in jtR  are the stringency of regulatory capital requirement adopted by the 
authorities (CAPRQ), the power granted to authorities to intervene in bank‟s decisions 
(OFFPR), private monitoring (PRI) and financial freedom index (FREE). We hypothesize 
that the regulatory variables impact on the operational autonomy, constraints and competitive 
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pressure banks face and therefore affect the bank‟s selection of the asset portfolio. The bank-
specific variables included in jitBANK are the market share of bank i in the national lending 
market (MARSHAR), the ratio of fixed assets over total assets (FIX), the ratio of liquid assets 
over customer and short-term funding (LIQ), and the ratio of capital over total risky assets
14
  
(CAP).  We control for MARSHAR and FIX is to capture the impact of customer base and 
physical distributional channel on banks‟ credit supply. We expect that banks with larger 
market share and more extensive networks would have higher ratio of loans over total earning 
assets. We control for LIQ to capture the preference of banks toward holding public security 
that is driven by liquidity mismatch of banks. If the motivation of banks to hold more liquid 
security is because banks are in shortage of liquidity, we would have a positive coefficient for 
LIQ. Finally, we control for the ratio of capital over total risky assets (CAP). As shown in 
Equation (7), the impact of the heterogeneity across banks in the level of capitalization on 
bank‟s asset allocation is determined by whether equity capital is more expensive than 
deposits. In addition to the macroeconomomic indicators ( jtM ), the regulatory variables 
( jtR ) and bank-specific variables ( jitBANK ), we introduce the difference between interest 
rate on loans and that on public security (MAR) into Equation (13). We measure it using the 
implicit interest rate charged by banks on loans minus the “risk free” (treasury bill) interest 
rate at which short-term government securities are issued or traded in the market. The 
implicit interest rate on loans is calculated by the interest income on loans divided by total 
loans. The data on the risk-free (treasury bill) interest rate were collected from the African 
Development Indicators. We predict a positive coefficient for MAR and a negative coefficient 
for 

 )1(tjiRISK . 
Both equations include a set of dummy time variables (TIMEt) for each year. These 
dummies capture any unobserved regional shock. Finally, jit and ωjit are white-noise error 
terms. We did not include either country-level or bank-level fixed effect because the time 
variation of national institutional setting variables on the protection of creditor rights is rather 
limited. The explanatory power of variables that change slowly over time would be mopped 
up by the fixed effects. Also, we cannot introduce both country-level or bank-level fixed 
effects simultaneously since for all banks located in the same country, the bank-specific fixed 
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 Total risk assets include: total loans (net), other listed securities, other securities, equity investments, 
securities, bonds, non-listed securities, other investments, deferred tax receivable, other non earning assets, and 
intangible assets (i.e. line 7480 in BankScope). 
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effect will overlap with country-specific fixed effect. The analysis is applied to a sample 
composed by commercial banks in 20 African countries during 1995-2008. The choice of the 
sample countries is directed by the availability of our key variable of interests.  The bank-
specific variables including the dependent variables in Equation (12) and (13) are constructed 
from bank-level financial data from BankScope database. The definition of the variables and 
the data sources are given in the Appendix. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of 
variables, and Table 2 reports the correlation coefficient of the variables.  
<INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE> 
5. Econometric issues and empirical results 
5.1 Econometric issues 
Given our panel data set, we consider pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), random-effect 
models and fixed-effect models, as possible estimators. Due to the limited variation of our 
key legal and institutional variables of interest, we narrow our options to pooled OLS and the 
random effects model for the first and second stages of estimation and testing. For both stages, 
the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multipier test (LM) suggest a rejection of the null 
hypothesis that individual bank effects are not relevant, which suggests that the random effect 
model is preferred to the pooled OLS estimator. Another econometric issue we have to deal 
with is the possibility of the endogeneity of legal rights code in our estimated equations
15
. In 
theory, the reverse causality would take place whenever the policy makers make adjustment 
on the legal rights code, according to their knowledge on bank risk-taking and bank asset-
allocation. However, as argued by Houston et al. (2010), the reverse causality would be less 
of a concern in the examination of individual bank firms, although it would be serious in a 
pure cross-country analysis. In addition, the use of the index rank of legal rights rather than 
the index of legal rights in our study would reduce the endogeneity, if any. Indeed, the 
endogeneity test in the first (Equation (12)) and second stage (Equation (13)) fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as 
exogenous
16
. We further carry out the endogeneity test of MAR, i.e. the difference in the 
interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime private sector customers minus the “risk 
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 Since our indicator of enforcement of creditor rights is a perception-based index, it may be endogenous.  
16
 The instruments we use for the tests are longitude and latitude, following the geographical endowment view 
on the formation of long-lasting institutions.  
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free” (treasury bill) interest rate at which short-term government securities are issued or 
traded in the market, in our second stage analysis. As shown in our analytical framework 
(Equation (2)), the change in the quantity of credit supply by the bank would be transited to 
the interest rate at the industry-level. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the specified 
endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous (P-value is 0.3)
17
.  To take into 
account the independence of the bank-specific dependent variables within a country since 
their exposure to the common unobservable country effects, we cluster the heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors by country. 
5.2 First stage: the impact of legal rights, the enforceability of legal rights and 
information sharing on bank risk-taking 
The random effects estimation results for equation (13) are presented in Table 3 (column 2). 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
The key variables of interest are the legal rights index, the enforcement of legal rights 
and the presence of informational sharing.  As shown in Table 3, the first-stage analysis 
results indicate that the presence of informational sharing mechanism and the strength of 
legal code do not have significant effect on bank risk-taking. The results, therefore, appear to 
be consistent with the view that stronger legal rights and information sharing may not 
necessarily translate into a decrease in the average default rate of the loan portfolio even if it 
leads to a lower default rate of an individual borrower. However, the enforceability of legal 
rights has a statistically significantly negative impact. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on ENFOR suggests that one standard deviation increase in the enforceability of 
legal rights (0.662) is associated with a change in the ratio of loan loss provision by -1.149  
(=0.662*-1.736). Given that the mean of the ratio of loan loss provision is 3.175, the effect is 
not only statistically significant but also economically significant.  
Regarding the regulatory variables, we find that an increase in financial freedom 
(FREE) induces a decrease in bank risk-taking, consistent with the insight of Barth et al., 
(2001) and Gonzalez (2005). We also find that increased stringency of capital requirements 
(CAPRQ) leads to an increase in the risks banks are taking, in accordance with the argument 
that banks under more restrictive regulatory capital requirements incur more cost of financial 
intermediation associated with raising capital and therefore decline to take risky investment 
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 The instrument we use for the test is one time period lag of MAR.  
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to neutralize the cost. However, private monitoring (PRI) and the existence of explicit deposit 
insurance scheme (INSUR) have no significant impact. The evidence which shows 
insignificant effect of the presence of explicit deposit insurance is consistent with the view 
that deposit insurance per se is not subject to moral hazard, we believe it could result from a 
combination of the low presence of the explicit deposit insurance scheme in our sample 
countries
18
, and the existence of implicit insurance in the countries that lack explicit deposit 
insurance schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005). Furthermore, the low competence and the 
shortage of right mechanism for depositors to monitor bank activities in both countries with 
explicit and implicit insurance may also contribute to the insignificant result.
 19
 With respect 
to other control variables, we find that banks with higher profitability (ROA), higher 
management skill (SKILL), and larger market share (MARSHAR) have a lower level of risk-
taking. We also find that lower inflation (INFLA) and higher GDP (LNGDP) are correlated 
with lower risk-taking by banks.  
5.3 Second stage: The impact of legal creditor rights, the enforceability of legal rights 
and information sharing, on bank asset-allocation 
The random effects estimation results for equation (14) are presented in Table 4 (column 2)
 20
. 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
We first check the consistency of our estimated results with the analytical framework 
on which our empirical analysis is based. The significant positive coefficient for MAR and a 
significant negative coefficient for 

 )1(tjiRISK  confirm the prediction of Equation (7) that a 
larger difference between the interest rate charged by banks on loans minus the "risk free" 
treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government securities are issued or traded in the 
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 Only 5 out of 20 sample countries have explicit deposit insurance in place, namely, Kenya (1988), Nigeria 
(1989), Tanzania (1994), Uganda (1994) and Zimbabwe (2003).  
19
 Andrianova et al., (2008) point out the deviation of the presence of explicit deposit insurance from the 
credibility of the promise of compensation in practice would also contribute the insignificant effect. For 
example, it takes 5 year average waiting time to receive compensation in Kenya. 
20
 Predicted values, of default risks of a bank derived from the first stage analysis, smaller than zero are 
excluded from the second stage. A two-stage estimation procedure that does not account for the presence of an 
estimated regressor (in our case, the predicted default risk) in the second stage will produce inconsistent and 
biased standard errors. Murphy and Topel propose a method to estimate the correct asymptotic covariance 
matrix for the second step estimator which, though applicable to panel data models, is computationally difficult 
to implement. As an alternative, we utilize a bootstrap to obtain consistent estimates of standard errors in stage 
two, following Vidovic and Khanna (2007) and Guan (2003) among others. 
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market, keep other things equal, lead the bank to allocate more their loanable funds to loans
21
, 
while the increase in the bank‟s expectation of default risks leads banks to decrease the 
bank‟s asset-allocation to loans, confirming the conjecture that a high loan default rate is the 
major factor for most banks in Africa to choose to shed away from the provision of credit. 
In terms of the key variables of interest, we find that stronger legal rights (LEG), more 
effective enforcement of legal rights (ENFOR), and the presence of information sharing 
institutions (SHAR) all are significantly associated with a higher proportion of loans, through 
the net impact on degree of competition and the operating cost of information production. 
The results on market share (MARSHAR) and the ratio of fixed assets over total assets (FIX) 
indicate that the larger market share and higher ratio of fixed assets over total assets lead a 
significant increase in the proportion of loans over total earning assets, supporting the 
positive role of consumer base and distribution channel on the bank‟s credit supply. Also, the 
significant negative coefficient on the capitalization ratio implies that the increase in the 
capitalization ratio leads to a decrease in the proportion of loans over total earning assets, 
which is the predicted result in the case where funding cost of equity capital is more 
expensive than deposits. Finally, the insignificant negative coefficient on liquidity assets over 
liquidity liability ratio (LIQ) suggests that managing liquid risks is not the reason for banks to 
reduce credit supply. To deal the concern that the estimated coefficient on LIQ may be 
contaminated by the presence of a reverse relation from the dependent variable to LIQ, i.e. 
banks that hold higher government securities (lower loans) have higher liquid assets. We redo 
our estimation of the Equation (13) by replacing contemporary LIQ with one time period lag 
of LIQ as the independent variable. The results are presented in Table 5: the coefficient on 
one period lag of LIQ is small and insignificant, while other results remain unchanged.  
We further consider two additional robustness tests. First, we introduce one more 
macro-variable, namely real GDP per capita growth rate (constant 2000 US dollar) 
(GDPPERCAPTA) into both first and second stage analysis. As argued by Djankov et al., 
(2007), rapid economic expansion may requires more credit. The data is collected from 
African Development indicator. The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. 
Secondly, we examine whether our results hold when alternative measure of the 
enforceability of the legal rights is used. Here, we consider the “Control of Corruption” 
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This reflects the view of Hannan (1991) that the optimal asset-allocation of banks is determined by the extent 
to which it is profitable for the bank to replace securities with loans in the bank‟s portfolio.. 
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constructed by Kaufmann et al., (2009). The index is a measurement of the perceptions of a 
very diverse group of respondents regarding the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. As documented by Kaufmann, et al., (2005), the 
perception-based corruption indicator explains a good deal of the extent to which a de jure 
notion of laws 'on the books' that differs substantially from the de facto reality that exists 'on 
the ground'. Therefore, it would be a suitable indicator to measure the extent to which laws 
on books are effectively applied in practice. Higher values indicate better control of 
corruption and more effective implementation of the written laws. The results are presented 
in Column 3 in Table 3 and 4 for the first and the second stage analysis, respectively. In both 
cases, the empirical results are highly consistent with our previous findings. 
<INSERT TABLES 5-7 HERE> 
Hence our results on the first and the second stages indicate that the stronger creditor 
rights, the presence of information sharing and the increase in the effectiveness of the 
enforcement of creditor legal rights leads to an increase in the proportion of loans over total 
earning assets, which is consistent with the essential idea of the law and finance literature that 
some environments are more conducive to writing and enforcing financial contracts than 
others, and that better contracting leads to a higher financial depth. However, those three 
aspects of the institutional setting on the protection of creditor rights appear to materialize 
their influence in different manners. While the stronger creditor rights, the presence of 
information sharing exert their impact through a composite effect of the enhancement of 
competition and the reduction of the operating cost of information production, the increase in 
the effectiveness of the enforcement of creditor legal rights does it through mitigating default 
risks of banks as well as the composite effect of enhancing competition and reducing the 
operating cost of information production. In addition, for the enforcement of creditor legal 
rights, the latter channel is stronger than the former. To be specific, one standard deviation 
increase in the enforceability of legal rights (0.662), keep other things equal, is associated 
with a change in the proportion of loans over earning assets by 4.876 {=( -0.454)*(-
1.149)+(0.662*6.578)}, 76% of which (=1-(1.149/4.876)) contributes to the latter channel. 
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6. Conclusion 
Recent research on the relation between the institutional setting for the protection of creditor 
rights and the development of the credit market offers macro-level evidence to the effect that 
the quality of the legal protection, enforceability of legal creditor rights and improvements in 
information sharing among creditors, are positively associated with the depth of the financial 
system. However, the mico-analysis to identify and quantify the specific mechanisms through 
which the institutional environment for the protection of creditor rights gets transmitted to the 
credit market is less developed. In this paper, inspired by Klein (1970, 1971) and Hannan 
(1991), we set up an analytical framework for the allocation of a bank‟s loanable funds 
between private credit (loans) and other competing stock of earning assets, within a general 
model of a bank‟s portfolio selection. The model captures an operational environment 
characterized by risk, imperfect asset elasticity and operating costs, We then link the 
institutional setting for the protection of creditor rights (encompassing legal rights for 
creditors, the enforcement of legal rights and information sharing mechanism among 
creditors) with the default risks banks are facing, the degree of competition in the credit 
market and banks‟ operating cost associated with information production and contract 
enforcement. Finally, we test whether and how the institutional settings for the protection of 
creditor rights affect the three channels and ultimately influence banks‟ credit supply.  
Using a three-dimensional unbalanced panel dataset of banks in 20 African countries 
over 1995-2008, we obtain evidence which suggests that better institutional setting for the 
protection of creditor rights (in terms of higher level legal codes for creditors, better 
enforceability of legal rights, and the presence of informational sharing among banks) 
encourage banks to allocate a significantly higher proportion of their earning assets to loans. 
This micro-level evidence is consistent with existing macro-level evidence. However, the 
three aspects of institutional setting appear to work through different channels. While the 
enforceability of legal rights works through mitigating banks‟ credit risks, and a composite 
net effect of promoting competition in the credit market and reducing banks‟ operating cost 
of informational acquisition, legal codes and information sharing materialize their positive 
effect through the composite effect on competition in the credit market and banks‟ operating 
cost of informational acquisition only.  
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Appendix: Variable definition and data sources 
Variable  Definition and data source 
National institutional setting on the protection of creditor rights. 
RULE OF LAW 
A measurement of the perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Data source: 
Kaufmann et al., (2009).  
CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION 
A measurement of the perceptions of a very diverse group of 
respondents regarding the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Data source: 
Kaufmann et al., (2009). 
LEG 
A measurement of the legal right of secured creditor in bankruptcy 
against defaulting borrowers. Data source: Djankov et al., (2007) and the 
World Bank‟s Doing Business Index. 
SHARE 
A dummy variable with a value one from the year when either a public 
registry or a private bureau starts to operate in a country and onwards, 
and zero prior to it. Data source: Djankov et al., (2007) and the World 
Bank‟s Doing Business Index. 
Industry regulatory variables 
CAPRQ 
Defined by answering the following questions: (1) Is the minimum 
required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle guidelines? 
(2) Does the ratio vary with individual bank‟s credit risk? (3) Does the 
ratio vary with market risk? (4–6) Before minimum capital adequacy is 
determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of 
capital: (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? 
(b) unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign 
exchange losses? (7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital 
verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (8) Can the initial or 
subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or 
government securities? (9) Can initial disbursement of capital be done 
with borrowed funds? The value is determined by adding 1 if the answer 
is yes to questions 1–7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the 
case of questions 8 and 9 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). Data source: three surveys 
performed by the World Bank in 2000, 2003 and 2008. 
OFFPR 
Defined by answering the following questions: (1) Can the supervisory 
authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? 
(2) Are there any mechanisms of cease-desist type orders whose 
infraction leads to automatic imposition of civil & penal sanctions on 
banks directors & managers? (3) Can the supervisory agency order 
directors/ management to constitute provisions to cover actual/potential 
losses? (4) Can the supervisory agency suspend director‟s decision to 
distribute dividends? (5) Can the supervisory agency suspend director‟s 
decision to distribute bonuses? (6) Can the supervisory agency suspend 
director‟s decision to distribute management fees? (7) Can the 
supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare bank 
insolvent? (8) Does banking law allow supervisory agency to suspend 
some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (9) Regarding bank 
restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency remove and 
replace management? (10) Regarding bank restructuring & 
reorganization, can supervisory agency remove and replace directors? 
The value is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-
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10 and 0 otherwise. Data source: three surveys performed by the World 
Bank in 2000, 2003 and 2008. 
PRI 
The value is determined by adding 1 if the answer is no to questions 1, 
while the opposite occurs in the case of questions 2-10 (i.e. yes=0, no 
=1): (1) Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income 
statement while loan is non-performing? (2) Are financial institutions 
required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any 
non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance sheet items 
disclosed to supervisors? (4) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
public? (5) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to 
public? (6) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading 
information? (7) Is an external audit compulsory? (8) Are there specific 
requirements for the extent of audit? (9) Are auditors licensed or 
certified? (10) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial 
banks? Data source: three surveys performed by the World Bank in 
2000, 2003 and 2008. 
INSUR 
A dummy variable that takes a value of one from the year when the 
explicit deposit insurance was put into effect, and zero prior to it. Data 
source: Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2005) and the International Association 
of Deposit Insurers. 
FREE 
The Financial Freedom Index measuring the extent of government 
regulation of financial services, the extent of state intervention in banks 
and other financial services, the difficulty of opening and operating 
financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals), and 
government influence on the allocation of credit. 
Data source: Heritage Foundation. 
Macro-economics variables 
LNGDP 
The natural logarithm of GDP (constant 2000 US dollar). Data source: 
African Development Indicator 
INFLA Inflation GDP deflator. Data source: African Development Indicator 
Industry-wise variable 
MAR (%) 
The difference between the implicit interest rate charged by banks on 
loans and the "risk free" treasury bill interest rate at which short-term 
government securities are issued or traded in the market. Data source: 
BankScope and African Development Indicator. 
Bank-specific variables 
RISK (%) Provision/total loans. Data source: BankScope 
ROA (%) Pre-taxation profit/total assets. Data source: BankScope 
SKILL (%) Overhead/(loans + total other earning assets). Data source: BankScope 
MARSHAR (%) 
Loans of bank I at year t/the sum of loans of commercial banks 
belonging to the same country. Source: BankScope, Author calculation. 
SP 


2
1
2
i
iSSP , and 


2
1
/
i
iii yyS , 1y  refers to interest-income and 2y  
refers to non-interest income. Source: BankScope, Author calculation. 
ASSET_ALLOCATION 
(%) 
Loans/(loans + government securities). Data source: BankScope. 
FIX (%) Fixed assets/ total assets. Data source: BankScope. 
CAP(%) Total equity/total risky assets. Data source: BankScope. 
LIQ (%) Liquidity assets/ customer and short-term funding. Source: BankScope. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RULE OF LAW -0.468  0.662  -1.717  0.940  
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION -0.465  0.665  -1.757  1.071  
LEG 0.671  0.283  0.000  1.000  
SHAR 0.626  0.484  0.000  1.000  
CAPRQ 5.688  1.836  2.000  9.000  
OFFPR 8.024  2.700  1.000  10.000  
PRI 7.474  1.489  3.000  10.000  
INSUR 0.387  0.487  0.000  1.000  
FREE 45.421  15.682  10.000  70.000  
LNGDP 23.612  1.566  19.873  25.929  
GDPPERCAPTA 2.336  3.273  -17.145  22.618  
INFLA 17.010  123.143  -5.755  5399.526  
MAR 25.341  21.202  0.103  297.172  
DEFAULT RISK 3.175 5.552 0.000 90.715 
ROA 2.704  3.209  -16.636  29.647  
SKILL 7.024  7.637  0.000  131.318  
MARSHAR 10.162  13.748  0.001  100.000  
SP 0.595  0.125  0.500  1.000  
ASSET-ALLOCATION 55.569  19.540  15.138  94.943  
FIX 3.585  4.227  0.000  49.944  
CAP 25.285  25.207  0.447  508.787  
LIQ 57.767  157.675  0.130  5575.393  
Note: The 20 African countries includes Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Again, the sample selection is dictated by the 
availability of the data 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix for the endogenous and explanatory variables 
 RISK ROA SKIL
L 
MS
R 
SP GD
P 
INF
L 
CAP
R 
OFF
P 
PRI   SHA
R 
INS
U 
FRE
E 
RO
L 
CO
C 
LEG AL MA
R 
FIX CAP LIQ 
RISK 1.0                     
ROA -.23 1.0                    
SKILL .29 .096 1.0                   
MSR -.03 .091 -.119 1.0                  
SP .04 .009 .045 .003 1.0                 
GDP -.02 -.15 -.06 -.496 -.07 1.0                
INFL .09 .125 .012 .105 .041 -.03 1.0               
CAPR .03 .086 .158 -.188 .063 .205 -.05 1.0              
OFFP .07 .048 .022 -.063 -.14 -.16 .029 -.093 1.0             
PRI -.02 -.06 -.067 -.26 -.04 .528 .005 .207 .074 1.0            
SHAR -.01 -.11 -.073 -.183 -.09 .48 -.08 .139 -.158 .44 1.0           
INSU -.12 .06 .195 -.279 .01 .185 .02 .318 .444 -.1 -.17 1.0          
FREE -.16 -.13 -.041 .028 .063 -.16 -.096 .075 -.209 .04 -.09 -.24 1.0         
ROL -.21 -.21 -.288 .119 .07 -.02 -.122 -.01 -.384 .25 .11 -.64 .571 1.0        
COC -.20 -.15 -.232 .166 .11 -.01 -.089 .074 -.593 .19 .21 -.68 .551 .895 1.0       
LEG .013 .145 .164 -.193 -.14 .181 .056 .258 -.102 -.2 -.06 .332 .016 -.28 -.15 1.0      
AL -.16 -.11 -.058 .104 .141 .048 -.046 -.025 -.341 .02 .19 -.26 .189 .273 .39 -.02 1.0     
MAR .19 .12 .43 -.07 .09 .01 .04 .03 -.03 -.08 .01 .01 .06 -.06 -.02 -.16 .13 1.0    
FIX .193 .019 .596 -.022 .026 -.11 -.002 .133 .039 -.1 -.06 .14 -.097 -.26 -.21 .087 -.05 .22 1.0   
CAP .034 .058 .114 -.115 .046 .009 -.002 .051 .004 -.3 -.01 .108 -.051 -.08 -.07 -.01 -.28 .08 .178 1.0  
LIQ .061 .022 .079 -.076 -.01 .048 .007 .062 .037 -.3 -.03 .129 -.083 -.12 -.12 .081 -.14 .04 .019 .134 1.0 
Key:  Variables are defined as in the Appendix table. 
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Table 3: The quality of institutional setting on the protection of creditor rights and bank risk-taking 
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision over total loans. The estimation is based 
on a random-effect model. The column 2 contains the results when the enforcement of legal rights is 
measured by Rule of Law index and the column 3 reports the results when the enforcement of legal 
rights is measured by Control of Corruption index.  The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. *, **, *** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Time dummy is included in the estimation while are not reported. The number of 
observations in the case when the enforcement of legal right is measured by the Rule of Law index is 
larger since the Rule of law indicator is available for Rwanda, Burundi, and Lesotho in 1995 and 1996 
while Corruption Control Index is not.  
 Column 2 Column 3 
 Rule of law Control of corruption 
 Coef. 
Robust Std.  
Err 
Coef. 
Robust Std.  
Err 
ROA -0.645***  0.273 -0.643***  0.274 
SKILL 0.165***  0.053 0.165***  0.052 
MARSHAR -0.028*  0.017 -0.027*  0.017 
SP 1.051  0.858 1.250  0.897 
LNGDP -0.721***  0.286 -0.754***  0.293 
INFLA 0.006***  0.001 0.006***  0.001 
CAPRQ 0.259**  0.119 0.290***  0.113 
OFFPR -0.102  0.073 -0.187***  0.072 
PRI 0.335  0.210 0.317  0.214 
INSUR -0.223  0.568 -0.428  0.537 
FREE -0.032**  0.018 -0.031*  0.019 
SHAR 0.552  0.464 0.706  0.458 
ENFOR  -1.736*** 0.575 -1.947*** 0.473 
LEG -0.615  0.663 -0.152  0.754 
Within R-square 0.2216 0.2250   
Between R-square 0.2724 0.2657 
Overall R-square 0.2425 0.2423 
No. of Obs. 2180 2174 
No. of countries 20 20 
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Table 4: The quality of institutional setting on the protection of creditor rights and bank asset-
allocation 
 Column 2 Column 3 
 Rule of law Control of corruption 
 Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std Err 
Coef. 
Bootstra
pped Std Err 
MAR 0.148***  0.053  0.147***  0.054  

 )1(tjiRISK  
-0.454*  0.255  -0.463*  0.251  
FIX 0.956***  0.300  0.963***  0.292  
CAP -0.190***  0.072  -0.181**  0.072  
MARSHAR 0.284**  0.142  0.319**  0.141  
LIQ -0.023  0.044  -0.023  0.042  
LNGDP 0.723  1.040  1.103  1.072  
INFLA -0.007  0.023  -0.007  0.023  
CAPRQ -0.599  0.555  -0.571  0.544  
OFFPR 0.066  0.504  0.394  0.551  
PRI -0.324  0.780  -0.714  0.759  
FREE 0.060  0.056  0.047  0.056  
SHAR 6.865***  2.416  6.575***  2.358  
ENFOR 6.578***  2.027  8.333***  2.132  
LEG 11.654**8  2.723  9.684***  2.655  
No. of countries 20 20 
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of total loans over the sum of loans and government securities. 
The estimation is based on a random-effect model. The column 2 contains the results when the 
enforcement of legal rights is measured by Rule of Law index and the column 3 reports the results 
when the enforcement of legal rights is measured by Control of Corruption index.  
)1( 

tjiRISK  in column 2 and column 3 is the predicted value corresponding to column 2 and 3 in 
Table 3 respectively. The predicted values that are smaller than zero are trimmed in the second stage 
analysis. 
The bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the country level. *, **, *** indicates statistical 
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Time dummy is included in the estimation 
while are not reported. 
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Table 5: The quality of institutional setting on the protection of creditor rights and bank asset-
allocation with one time period lag of liquidity mismatch  
 Coef. 
Bootstrapped 
Std Err 
MAR 0.147***  0.054  

 )1(tjiRISK  
-0.512**  0.253  
FIX 0.995***  0.312  
CAP -0.200***  0.070  
MARSHAR 0.286**  0.140  
One time period lag of LIQ 0.000  0.017  
LNGDP 0.702  1.073  
INFLA -0.007  0.024  
CAPRQ -0.661  0.504  
OFFPR 0.074  0.530  
PRI -0.241  0.817  
FREE 0.063  0.059  
SHAR 6.921***  2.352  
ENFOR (rule of law) 7.240***  2.003  
LEG 11.734***  2.774  
No. of countries 20 
Note: the table contains the results of estimating Equation (13) with rule of law as the measurement of 
the legal code of creditor right, while replacing contemporary LIQ with one-time period lag of LIQ.  
The dependent variable is the ratio of total loans over the sum of loans and government securities. The 
estimation is based on a random-effect model. )1( 

tjiRISK  is the predicted value corresponding to 
column 2 in Table 3. The predicted values that are smaller than zero are trimmed off.  
The bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the country level. *, **, *** indicates statistical 
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Time dummy is included in the estimation 
while are not reported. 
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Table 6: The estimated results of the first-stage analysis with an additional macro-variable, exchange 
rate adjusted real GDP per capita growth rate (i.e. GDPPERCAPTA) 
 Coef. 
Robust Std.  
Err 
ROA -0.648**  0.270  
SKILL 0.165***  0.053  
MARSHAR -0.026*  0.016  
SP 1.000  0.846  
LNGDP -0.690***  0.278  
GDPPERCAPTA -0.090*  0.049  
INFLA 0.006***  0.001  
CAPRQ 0.245**  0.110  
OFFPR -0.079  0.068  
PRI 0.290  0.203  
INSUR -0.203  0.538  
FREE -0.030*  0.018  
SHAR 0.647  0.450  
ENFOR (Rule of law) -1.671***  0.553  
LEG -0.617  0.644  
Within R-square 0.2235  
Between R-square 0.2717 
Overall R-square 0.2448  
No. of obs. 2180 
No. of countries 20 
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision over total loans. The estimation is based 
on a random-effect model. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. *, **, *** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Time 
dummy is included in the estimation while are not reported. 
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Table 7: The estimated results of the second-stage analysis with the default risks of banks derived 
from Table 6 and an additional macro-variable, exchange rate adjusted real GDP per capita growth 
rate (i.e. GDPPERCAPTA).  
 Coef. 
Bootstra
pped Std Err 
MAR 0.149***  0.053  

 )1(tjiRISK  
-0.461*  0.262  
FIX 0.955***  0.294  
CAP -0.189***  0.072  
MARSHAR 0.289**  0.139  
LIQ -0.023  0.049  
LNGDP 0.673  1.047  
GDPPERCAPTA 0.035  0.174  
INFLA -0.007  0.024  
CAPRQ -0.588  0.535  
OFFPR 0.035  0.495  
PRI -0.230  0.822  
FREE 0.062  0.058  
SHAR 6.798***  2.329  
ENFOR(rule of law)  6.497***  2.018  
LEG 11.261***  2.858  
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of total loans over total earning assets. The estimation is based 
on a random-effect model. )1( 

tjiRISK  is the predicted value corresponding to the results in Table 6. 
The predicted values that are smaller than zero are trimmed off in the second stage analysis. 
The bootstrap standard errors are clustered at the country level.*, **, *** indicates statistical 
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Time dummy is included in the estimation 
while are not reported. 
 
 
